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Electricity Market Reform: So what’s 
new? 
 
Introduction 
Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, successive British governments privatised state 
owned utilities and public services. Public goods would be delivered through commercial 
markets and government would steer at arms length. However, the British government has 
recently shifted towards an interventionist stance. This paper uses cultural theory (CT) to 
examine this shift. 
In 2013, the British government restructured Britain’s electricity markets through a 
programme of Electricity Market Reform (EMR). Energy security and reducing carbon 
emissions (through transition to an electricity system based around low carbon 
technologies) can be understood as public goods (Abbott, 2001). EMR aimed to create 
regulatory mechanisms that would encourage investment in nuclear power, renewable 
energy, and Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). A new system of contracts, called 
‘contracts for differences’ (CfDs) was introduced to give guaranteed, indexed linked, prices 
for electricity generated from low carbon sources over specified long term periods. EMR 
also proposed a ‘capacity mechanism’ designed to ensure that there is sufficient generating 
capacity to meet peak demand for electricity. These measures operate alongside a policy of 
increasing the price of fossil fuels through the use of a ‘carbon levy’. This levy takes the 
form of a carbon floor price that seeks to boost the low EU ETS price, although in 2014, the 
government decided to cap such increases. 
Kern et al. (2013) suggest that since 2003 there has been a  ‘paradigm’ shift in the British 
electricity industry. The focus on using the market to realise policy has been replaced by an 
approach that allows for greater state steering. Government involvement is now thought 
Final manuscript (NOT anonymised)
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necessary to promote investment in the infrastructure necessary to secure the public goods 
of energy security and a decarbonised economy (Bolton and Foxon, 2015). However, as 
Kern et al. (2013, p. 1) point out‘…there has been relatively little shift in how energy 
systems operate…’As they imply, sociotechnical theories may be more efficacious in 
studying changes in technical systems compared to political science.  
Nevertheless changes introduced through EMR constitute political regulation, and the 
success of this qualitatively different system depends on regulatory effectiveness. 
Government now makes technological choices, makes orders for reserve generation and 
negotiates details of some individual projects. However, Kern et al (2013) do not describe 
EMR in detail whilst Bolton and Foxon (2015) do not discuss the logic informing the 
regulatory changes instituted by EMR. The public goods associated with EMR (energy 
security and decarbonisation) are difficult to realise due to the sheer costs involved in 
constructing electricity generation infrastructure. However, as electricity is critical for 
operation of modern society and climate change may pose a catastrophic threat, the British 
government cannot avoid its responsibilities. Indeed, Giddens (2015: 157) observes that to 
address climate change, governments must act to curtail carbon emissions. Likewise 
Johnston and Deeming (2015) also stress the need for government intervention. As such, 
EMR represents a special case of regulatory reform and understanding the factors that 
inform government decisions is key task for public policy scholars.  
This paper develops analysis of the design of EMR itself. The central research question is 
to understand how, and the extent to which, the electricity system has moved from an 
emphasis on outcomes being decided by market mechanisms towards outcomes being 
influenced by state direction. We develop cultural theory’s application in public policy, in the 
fields of public regulation and public goods. We use CT to understand and explain change 
in public regulation, how public goods are constructed and how government attempts to 
realise them through that regulation (in EMR). As we discuss in the next section, CT is well 
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placed to study the process of constructing and implementing public goods, regulatory and 
institutional change and the tensions between different cultural biases. In this case, a 
tension can be observed betweenenhanced state interventions through EMR in an era of 
economic liberalisation. The lessons could throw light in other cases involving conflicts of 
political economy and the delivery of public goods. This CT analysis may highlight a 
particular problem in regulation of public goods policies when there are conflicts between 
different cultural preferences. Cultural theory may prove applicable to many other areas of 
regulation of public goods, although further studies will be needed to determine how wide 
this scope could be. 
 
Cultural Approaches to Regulation 
Cultural theory (CT) is an approach that was developed through the work of Douglas (1974, 
1982), Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) and others (see Thompson et al. 1990 or 
Mamadouh1999 for reviews) and has been successfully applied to public administration 
and regulatory issues (Hood 1998, Lodge et al. 2011). CT argues that social behaviours 
reflect inherent cultural bias and claims that there are two basic divisions, or dimensions 
within a culture: attitudes around ‘grid’ and ‘group’. Grid concerns (positive or negative) 
attitude to rules whilst group concerns attitude to group solidarity, either weak or strong. Put 
together these dimensions generate four basic cultural approaches, seen in the Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 here (see m/s end) 
 
First, (top left) is a pattern of apathetic rule-following and ‘fatalist’ political disengagement. 
Bottom left is individualism, associated with choice, competition between people and – by 
extension - use of markets to allocate resources. In contrast, ‘egalitarians’ have higher 
group and favour behaviour based on solidarity with particular norms or values rather than 
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rules per se. Finally, top right ‘hierarchists’ favour an ordered society based on both group 
coherence and rule following. In his application to regulatory systems, Hood (1998, 100) 
argues that the ‘individualist’ (non-group, non-rule oriented) approach assumes that 
“…markets will ordinarily produce better results than bureaucratic hierarchies…” 
Cultural theory can complement institutional analysis in the renewable and low carbon 
energy sphere (Kern et al. 2014, Lauber and Schenner 2011) by helping to understand how 
institutional change occurs. Cultural theorists argue that the design of institutional 
arrangements reflects the cultural bias of a society; something that can be identified 
through CT. Swedlow (2011, 704) says: 
CT contributes significantly to institutional accounts of politics by specifying the 
types of institutions that can exist...Events and behavior that are anomalous 
from one cultural perspective, and/or better explained or understood from 
another, can be catalysts of cultural change for both individuals and institutions 
A key advantage of the CT approach compared to other modes of ideational analysis is that 
it can categorise types of cultural bias and link them to how different institutions and public 
policies emerge and change. Institutions and policies may differ as they embody some 
types and/or combinations of cultural bias rather than others. 
The construction of demand for public goods and the shift towards more interventionist 
methods in an area of public regulation can be understood by reference to changes in grid 
and group orientations. It is possible to use CT to understand how greater priority given to 
public goods such as carbon reduction and energy security is associated with the 
regulatory changes deployed to accommodate them. In particular, carbon reduction and 
energy security are collective problems (associated with high group) but given the scale of 
the investments needed, strong rules are necessary to govern the market to ensure that 
companies are incentivised to make the necessary investments (requiring high grid). 
Liberalised markets do have rules, but these are to assist competition (low grid) as 
companies vie for business against others (low group). 
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Measuring Cultural Bias 
This can be done through using surveys directly, using evidence from surveys to link 
particular policies and cultural bias, and by making judgements about how specific policies 
can be associated with particular cultural biases. We do not survey individuals for this study 
because we seek to link cultural bias with changing policies and regulations in EMR rather 
than attitudes of policymakers themselves. However, we do make use of existing surveys to 
link cultural biases and political strategies (e.g. between notions of ‘order’ and ‘hierarchy’), 
and also to analyse how cultural bias may influence policy outcomes.  
Several CT analyses have measured cultural bias by using judgement to associate 
particular attitudes and/or policies and institutions with different cultural biases. These 
include Hood (1998), Hendriks (2004),and Tansey and O’Riordan (1999), the latter two 
examining issues with a strong environmental component. We adopt this technique of 
measuring cultural bias; we make judgements about whether policies reflect individualism 
and competition (low grid and group), hierarchy (high grid, high group) or egalitarianism 
(low grid, high group). 
Wildavsky (1987) discusses poll findings that reveals differences in preferences for public 
goods such as defence between ‘the general public’, ‘executives of small and large 
corporations’ and, ‘environmentalists’, commenting that: ‘Maintaining order in the nation 
gets around 80% or more from everyone else but just 47% from environmentalists. On an 
egalitarian issue, such as having more say at work, the situation is reversed’ (Wildavsky 
1987, 14). These are US studies, but they may cast light on linkages in British politics. 
Gamble (1988) characterised Thatcherism as ‘the free market and the strong state’. This 
involves a conservative attachment to competitive individualism in the economic sphere but 
also an attachment to maintaining social order, or hierarchy, for example through the 
police.  
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Jones (2011) studied attitudes to climate change. He found that both egalitarian and 
hierarchical viewpoints gave priority to climate change as a policy objective. The 
egalitarians were environmentalist in standpoint whilst the hierarchs followed scientific 
opinion. Individualists were less interested in climate change as a leading policy objective. 
Johnston and Deeming (2015) also point to importance of examining underlying values and 
cultural beliefs and highlight attitudinal distinctionson the subject of climate change between 
individualists and hierarchs. We can utilise these findings in this study. For example, a 
hierarchical preference for ‘order’ could be associated with assuring energy security, and  
this could in turn be associated with promoting certain technologies such as nuclear power. 
Particular instruments, e.g. auctions, may be associated with an individualist approach 
whilst egalitarian’ environmental groups often espouse renewable energy. 
Many consumers are unconcerned about policy issues and can be described as policy 
‘fatalists’. However we do not focus on ‘fatalism’ as a cultural bias in this study. Many 
applications of CT dispense with the ‘fatalist’ as fatalists have disengaged with political 
processes (see Swedlow, 2011, 707). We also dispense with this category as it does not 
help analyse institutional change in this case. 
 
Regulation and public goods 
Public goods are, according to Hood (1983, 4) concerned with a) the jointness of 
consumption; consumers cannot derive solutions ‘separately and severally’, b) ‘non-
excludability’;  it is not possible to stop those who do not wish to pay for the public good 
from consuming the benefits, and c) ‘Indivisibility’; the provision of the public good for one 
consumer does not reduce the ‘benefits conveyed to others by these works’. We categorise 
three streams of theory of public goods. One stream focuses on problems of 
implementation (Ostrom 1991, Rhinard et al. 2013). A second stream, a ‘public choice’ 
approach, asks whether public goods are artefacts of governments who manufacture 
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activity at the behest of well-placed interest groups (Holcombe 1997). A third stream 
examines how the ‘public good’ is constructed through the growth and activity of social 
movements (Williams 1995). Public choice approaches reflect an ‘individualistic’ bias, given 
their prioritisation of market rather than state based activity to solve problems, whilst social 
movement approaches represent an egalitarian bias since they focus on how social 
movements, which tend to pursue egalitarian objectives, construct some public goods. We 
combine lessons from these different streams to analyse how cultural bias influences the 
construction of public goods in the electricity sphere.  
Public goods associated with energy policy, namely the reduction of carbon emissions and 
stability of supply (energy security), share key characteristics with welfare goods such as 
education, social security and health. Decisions regarding the means of supply and the 
distribution of such goods have to be interpreted and are contested. Energy security is 
capable of various interpretations (Toke and Vezirgiannidou 2013) and there are several 
combinations of technologies that can achieve low carbon outcomes. The politics of energy 
are ensconced in regulatory processes, which are themselves influenced by changing 
political economy, in particular the balance between state direction and market power. 
In the late 1980s, there was a move away from hierarchical modes of governance in the 
public sector. Industries and public utilities were privatised and liberalised. An individualistic 
cultural bias displaced hierarchical means of governance. Governments sought to govern 
markets at a distance through arms length oversight and use of rules and standards (Yeung 
2010, p. 65-67). Majone (1994) described the emergence of a ‘regulatory state’ in place of 
the publically owned and managed ‘welfare state’. Underpinning the regulatory state was an 
individualist worldview that held that the role of modern government was to ensure the 
functioning of markets, achieving low prices for consumers. Governments did not  issue 
instructions to industry about particular projects but sought to steer through regulation. 
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However, under EMR there is a greater degree of steering by the state than was in 
evidence before.  
 
Method 
Our method mobilises themes of cultural bias to analyse EMR. This is a generalised type of 
‘thematic’ study (Braun and Clarke 2006). Our study, whilst generalised in the sense that it 
does not engage in a specific coding methodology, nevertheless utilises various sources of 
text to chart changes in the construction of public goods and regulatory policy using CT. 
Although EMR itself only began towards the end of 2010 it is necessary to analyse the 
emergence of public goods before 2010 as well as their significance afterwards. However 
the most intense period of analysis is since 2010. 
The data that we use includes interviews from a funded study of nuclear power policy and 
also one interview designed to investigate the role of the Committee on Climate Change. 
The interviews were held with both governmental and non-governmental policymakers. We 
used this data as evidence alongside documents including governmental policy position 
papers, governmental policy notes, papers and statements by a range of commercial and 
non-commercial NGOs and media reports carried in the popular and energy industry trade 
press. 
By triangulating our data, we are able to judge which documents and public statements 
reflect important decision-making, after which we can identify the key passages and then 
associate them with the CT analytical framework that we have set out. The first empirical 
section deals with how cultural bias can be used to frame energy security and climate 
change as public goods in the electricity sector, so setting the scene for the adoption of 
EMR. There is a historical theme to this since there is a drift from ‘individualistic’ towards 
more ‘egalitarian’ and ‘hierarchical’ orientation of public goods. The second, most 
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extensive, empirical section will detail how, based on this construction of public goods, 
cultural bias is associated with aspects of the electricity regulatory framework ensconced in 
EMR. We again divide the discussion up, again, into ‘individualism’, ‘egalitarianism’ and 
‘hierarchy’. In practice, the policy instruments will often be influenced by more than one 
cultural bias, so it is not always possible to hermetically seal each section from the others.  
The construction of public goods 
We focus on the construction of two public goods in particular, carbon emission abatement 
and energy security. 
Individualism: The electricity industry was privatised and liberalised in 1990. The 
dominant frame was one of individualistic competition in which the [regulatory] state was 
restricted to achieving ‘market efficiency’ (Majone 1994).The public good was to be 
achieved through competition between providers, with the aim of reducing prices for 
consumer. There were some marginal exceptions to this lack of direct government 
involvement in generation investment decisions. The Government withheld nuclear power 
from the privatisation effort and established a ‘fossil fuel levy’ (effectively a production tax) 
to fund a ‘non-fossil fuel obligation’ (NFFO) to assure the completion of the half-built 
Sizewell B nuclear power plant (Bier et al. 2003, 122). In addition, a nascent renewable 
sector was encouraged as contracts were reserved for renewable energy projects. 
However, this renewable programme was small, limited to around 1 per cent of electricity 
generation (Mitchell and Connor 2004).  
Energy security was associated with ‘diversity’ of supply and little attention was paid the 
need to reduce greenhouse gases. This approach was reflected in the Government’s 1995 
review of nuclear power (DTI 1995) which  held that there were “…no compelling reasons 
for supposing that the market will not of its own accord provide an appropriate level of 
diversity’ (DTI 1995, 38). State support of nuclear power was not necessary and  Britain’s 
most modern nuclear power plants should be privatised. It was assumed that the private 
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sector would invest in nuclear power should it prove economical. The review also argued 
that there was ‘uncertainty’ about the extent of need for future reductions of carbon dioxide 
emissions and that new gas fired power plants being built would obviate the need for new 
nuclear power (DTI 1995, 26-30). The scepticism about prioritising carbon reduction, the 
strong support for markets and the disavowal of state steering are consistent with 
individualism.  
 
Egalitarianism: Conflicts began to emerge between the aims of market efficiency and 
emergent demands for non-market objectives, particularly for sustainable energy (Mitchell 
and Woodman 2010, 573-576). The Utilities Act of 2000, introduced by the Labour 
Government, amalgamated the regulators for gas and electricity, producing OFGEM. 
According to Moran (2003, 111) the legislation ‘imposes on OFGEM an obligation to have 
regard in regulation to various socially excluded groups, and to take guidance from the 
Secretary of State on social and environmental objectives.’ These are egalitarian 
objectives, albeit delivered in the context of competitive markets. In 2002, a Renewables 
Obligation (RO) was introduced to increase the proportion of electricity supplied by 
renewable energy. However, nuclear power was still excluded from access to incentives on 
the grounds of a lack of economic viability (DTI 2003).  
The Renewables Obligation (RO) was a ‘market based’ scheme managed by OFGEM 
where government did not ‘pick winners’ and, initially, offered the same incentives for all 
renewable energy technologies (DTI 2000). Decisions about contracts and prices were 
made by the electricity industry themselves and it was hoped that this would generate lower 
prices through competition between market actors. Hence the ‘egalitarian’ objectives that 
were introduced were combined with a dominant ‘individualist’ cultural bias that ordained 
market mechanisms as the desired mode of operation. As the decade progressed there 
was an intensification of commitments regarding climate change, leading to the 2008 
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Climate Change Act, which committed the Government to delivering an 80% reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. 
 
Hierarchy: From 2004 onwards, energy prices began to rise sharply alongside oil price 
increases. Contemporaneous to this, imports of natural gas rose as consumption increased 
and North Sea production fell. These events were associated with rising fears about energy 
security. According to Kuzemko (2014) energy policy objectives became more politicised 
and ‘securitised’. Fears about maintaining order in the sense of maintaining both the 
reliability and the political security of the energy supply grew, leading to demands that the 
state take action to maintain this order. Government policy shifted towards seeing nuclear 
power as crucial to maintaining energy security (alongside climate change mitigation) and 
that ‘the Government should take active steps to facilitate this’ (DBERR 2008, 6). 
Also concerns mounted that the RO was not cost-effective and that it was too oriented 
towards onshore rather than offshore wind. Hence there was a move towards greater 
hierarchical determination of what prices should be paid for different types of renewable 
energy technology, with the quantity of incentives given under the RO modulated according 
to different renewable energy technologies. OFGEM organised an initiative called ‘Project 
Discovery’ which reported in February 2010 and favoured a direct role for government in 
ensuring the construction of new electricity generation capacity (OFGEM 2010). This was 
followed by similar calls by an inter-departmental report(Treasury/DECC 2010, 4-5). 
The Committee on Climate Change (CCC), established following the passage of the 2008 
Climate Change Act, recommended the use of nuclear power, renewable energy, energy 
efficiency, and CCS to achieve the Act’s goals. The CCC became, in formal terms, an 
arbiter of knowledge about government policy. For example, the coalition agreement 
between the Conservatives and Liberal Democratsstates that decisions regarding 
expansion of renewables will be made be “…subject…”to the advice of the CCC” (HM 
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Government, 2010, 16). Likewise, the CCC was asked, in 2011, to ‘arbitrate’ between the 
coalition partners who differed on the relative roles of nuclear power and renewable energy 
(interview with official of CCC 16/12/2013). Knowledge about counteracting climate change 
was thus dispensed in a hierarchical fashion through the CCC. 
 
Cultural bias and different public goods 
It should be borne in mind that as public goods energy security and climate change may 
appeal to different political currents of opinion and that the differences can be understood 
using the cultural bias categories. As discussed earlier, in reference to work by Wildavsky 
(1987), the hierarchical notion of ‘order’ and energy security is likely to appeal to 
conservatives and establishment actors rather more than egalitarian environmental 
interests. On the other hand, environmental objectives, including climate change are likely 
to appeal more to environmentalists than notions of order and energy security. Opinion 
polling conducted by YouGov in 2013 (YouGov 2013a and 2013b) implies sets of opinions 
that may correspond to such analysis.  
A large majority of Conservative voters agreed that ‘it was right to spend money supporting 
nuclear power’ (60 to 21 per cent), while a majority of Labour voters were against this 
proposition (40 to 31 per cent) (YouGov 2013a 8). Labour voters tended to be more 
favourably disposed towards renewable energy than Conservatives. On the other hand, a 
clear majority of Conservative voters agreed with the statement that climate change claims  
‘Have been exaggerated - the threat is not as real as many scientists have said’ (by 54 to 
35 per cent), whilst a large majority of Labour votes agreed that the claims have NOT been 
exaggerated (by 64 to 20 per cent) (YouGov 2013b, 14). Conservative voters may be 
attracted to the notion of order and security, even though they may not be so enamoured by 
the need for strong action to counter climate change as Labour supporters. Environmental 
NGOs have been enthusiastic about promoting renewable energy, but indifferent or actively 
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hostile to nuclear power. Support for measures to ensure construction of new nuclear 
power has been strongest among establishment lobbyists such as the major electricity 
companies. These companies took increasing interest in nuclear power and formulated 
proposals for up to 10 new nuclear power stations post 2007 (Jones 2009). 
We can see that the public goods that are the key basis for EMR, carbon reduction and 
energy security, appealed to different constituencies of voters on the basis of differing 
cultural biases. Conservatives may value nuclear power more because it can produce 
‘order’ through energy security and is highly centralised, while green activists may prioritise 
combating climate change and value renewable energy, which is more decentralised. 
 
Details of Electricity Market Reform (EMR) 
The changing understanding of public goods has informed a gradual shift towards more 
hierarchical approaches to regulating the electricity market, and this can be better 
understood in the context of how this co-exists with other types of cultural bias. We now 
discuss how different cultural biases have informed EMR. 
 
Individualism: Advancing carbon reduction and energy security was underpinned by a 
commitment to markets and competition. EMR would ‘lead to competition within and 
between different low-carbon generation technologies for their appropriate role in the 
energy mix’. The electricity market was to be reformed to produce more competition 
between generation technologies and companies, greater access for new market entrants 
and increased market liquidity (DECC 2012, 8).The Government emphasised that it was 
offering support for all low carbon technologies (DECC 2012). In respect of plans for new 
nuclear builds, the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change insisted that: ‘I am 
determined that the consumer or the taxpayer will not bear the risk of construction over-
runs’ (Wintour 2013). Auctions were to be the preferred method of delivering premium price 
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contracts for difference (CfDs) to ensure competitive outcomes for low carbon energy The 
contracts for difference were made available for non renewable, low carbon energy sources 
including carbon capture and storage and nuclear power.  
The Government’s initial proposals for EMR (DECC 2010) appeared to favour having an 
auction that would result in the same prices being offered to all low carbon generators. 
However, this proposal was criticised on account that it seemed to offer a ‘one size fits all’ 
solution in that one type of contract would be available for all generators. The Select 
Committee on Energy and Climate Change argued that this would benefit nuclear power 
developers but penalise renewable generators. It seemed to many (at that time) that 
nuclear power would be the cheapest main source of low carbon energy (Committee on 
Climate Change 2011) and other technologies would have to compete against the price set 
by nuclear power. Government was inching towards a more hierarchical role in deciding a 
premium price payable for low carbon electricity, but still held out an expectation that 
markets could decide what the relative mix of technologies necessary to secure low carbon 
electricity generation. 
A White Paper on EMR followed in the summer of 2011 and proposed that a set of 
differentiated prices should be paid for low carbon electricity sources – various types of 
renewable energy, CCS, and nuclear power. These would be premium price agreements 
realised through ‘contracts for difference.’ However, the White Paper failed to make clear 
who would ‘guarantee’ that the prices would be paid. The Treasury expected the guarantee 
to be borne by the network of private electricity company actors through a levy and 
settlement mechanism. This was regarded as inadequate by both nuclear developers and 
renewable energy developers. Industry wanted the government to act as a ‘counterparty’ to 
the CfDs to guarantee that the premium prices would be paid according to the CfD terms. 
Failure to achieve this would increase the financial risks in low carbon energy. As we 
discuss below, the Government later agreed to guarantee the CfDs in what was a shift 
towards hierarchy.  
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In the end the Government did organise a competitive method of allocating CfDs through a 
process involving  ‘auctions’ of CfDs, although only for renewable energy. The results 
presaged what was acclaimed as a sharp reduction in premiums necessary to support 
renewable energy projects. (Carbon Brief 2015). However no auctions for other 
technologies appeared on the agenda. 
 
Egalitarianism: Egalitarianism formed the centrepiece of the justification for the policy of 
giving premium price CfDs to ‘low carbon fuels.’ First it offered equality of support to 
companies on the basis of whether they could achieve an environmental objective, and 
secondly it represented a key policy driver for the achievement of climate change 
objectives themselves. However, this approach was widely seen as a heavily disguised 
way of providing subsidies to nuclear power given previous commitments (Select 
Committee on Energy and Climate Change 2011). The ‘egalitarian’ support for renewable 
energy by way of its promotion in support of climate change abatement pre-dated EMR, in 
the form of the Renewables Obligation (RO). In addition, a feed-in tariff for small renewable 
energy projects had been put in place under legislation passed in 2008.  
A further low carbon technology, carbon-capture and storage (CCS), was made a 
candidate for support through CfDs, although to date no CfDs have been offered for this 
technology. The EMR proposals were criticised, in effect, for putting forward an egalitarian 
argument as a facade to promote nuclear power. One submission to the consultation on the 
initial EMR proposals commented: ‘The government claims that the intention of the EMR is 
to encourage low carbon investment. However, it seems to us that the overarching aim of 
the EMR from the Government’s perspective is to enable the building of new nuclear 
power...’ (Mitchell et al.2011). 
 
Hierarchy: In general, the year 2010 saw a realisation by government circles that the 
energy security and climate change public goods were not going to be delivered by sole 
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reliance on the individualistic bias upon which liberalised energy system had so far been 
based. EMR was therefore proposed on the basis of incorporating more hierarchy in the 
context of individualistic competition We categorise seven instances where the EMR 
system represents a more hierarchical system of managing policy for the electricity system 
than existed before.  
First, (in the autumn of 2010) the Treasury took control over the total amount of levies on 
electricity bills to support low carbon energy. According to a report issued by the National 
Audit Office (NAO 2013, 4):‘The key objectives of the government’s energy policy are to 
ensure a secure energy supply, to meet statutory decarbonisation targets and to keep the 
cost of energy affordable for consumers.’ To achieve this, the government had sought to set 
prices paid for electricity from specific technologies and had imposed levies on electricity 
suppliers to support investment by redirecting funds. As these costs would invariably be 
passed onto consumers, the Treasury and DECC had concluded that a framework was 
required to minimise the costs to industry and the consumer. Alongside the publication of 
proposals for EMR there was a commitment to exert government control over the amount 
that was spent on promoting low carbon fuels. This represents a hierarchical effort to limit 
ambitions to decarbonise the electricity supply to what was deemed affordable by the 
Treasury. This is in contrast to the open-ended nature of spending envisaged by the RO. 
Although DECC still had some latitude to decide how to slice up the cake between low 
carbon fuels, the Treasury was interested in controlling the amounts of money that would 
be paid by consumers for low carbon energy via a mechanism called the ‘Levy Control 
Framework’ (LCF). 
Second, in the 2011 White Paper (DECC 2011, 45) the Government excluded nuclear 
power and CCS from auctions on the grounds that these technologies had ‘less mature 
markets with fewer participants’. So-called ‘investment instruments’ were devised through 
which precise terms and conditions were negotiated with selected generators for specific 
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schemes. Prominently featured is EDF Energy’s scheme for Hinkley Point C, the first plant 
in the planned nuclear construction programme. Hinkley C would supply around 7 per cent 
of Britain’s electricity from two reactors. Contractual terms was provisionally agreed (but to 
date, not finalised) in October 2013, including a strike price of £92.50 (2012 prices) to be 
paid for 35 years subject to CPI indexation (HM Government 2013). Investment instruments 
were also issued to some large biomass and offshore wind power schemes. This was 
justified as being a transitional measure for large  energy schemes. 
Third, the government was gradually pushed away from a position of leaving precise 
technical choices for low carbon electricity generation entirely up to the market. The issue 
of investment instruments was part of this shift, but so was the Government’s acceptance of 
a system of state guarantees for the CfDs. The CfDs are guaranteed through the ‘Low 
Carbon Contracts Company’ which is owned by DECC. From the evidence, including 
evidence to Select Committee hearings, it appears that pressure to provide greater 
regulatory certainty for low carbon technologies, especially nuclear, came from the 
electricity industry itself, rather than originating in Government or pressure from the 
Opposition (Energy and Climate Change Select Committee, 2011, 2012, 2013).  
Fourth, the Government agreed to offer loan guarantees to cover substantial parts of the 
investment for selected low carbon generators, mainly nuclear power. However, the loan 
guarantees only cover part of investment cost and the risks of construction costs overruns 
were not fully underwritten by the Government. The Government was adamant that it would 
not ‘underwrite’ the construction risks of nuclear power investments, a position that 
Conservative Party politicians had consistently maintained (Hendry 2008). It maintained 
that the CfD mechanism was sufficient to lower the cost of capital incurred by would-be 
developers. This was despite pressure from supporters of nuclear power to underwrite 
construction costs.. 
Pressure increased on the Government to increase direct support for nuclear power after 
electricity companies began to pull out of the proposed nuclear power deals, starting in 
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early 2012. Indeed, by May 2013 all of the three initial nuclear consortia had fallen apart, 
with five of the six major British electricity companies withdrawing from the plans. The 
Government succeeded in re-selling two of the concessions and EDF re-structured its plans 
for the third. However, the start of construction of nuclear power stations was delayed. EDF 
has continued to back its initial plans at Hinkley Point C and possibly another project at 
Sizewell C. The French state controls a majority share in EDF and two state-owned 
Chinese nuclear companies have purchased minority stakes in the Hinkley C project. 
There are two economic issues that have undermined prospects for nuclear development. 
One was that the estimates of the cost of nuclear power plants had increased dramatically 
following cost escalations in EPRs being built in Finland and France (Lévêqueand Rangel 
2013).. Second was the reluctance of financial institutions to lend or invest money in 
nuclear power without firm - in effect state - guarantees against the risk of cost overruns. 
The Treasury agreed to offer £10 billion worth of loan guarantees for Hinkley C(HM 
Treasury 2013, 9), but this still left the developers to shoulder construction risk for the rest 
of the investment, including any cost overruns. 
Once again, the DECC Select Committee was important in pressurising government to 
become more directly involved in the implementation of EMR. It accepted evidence from the 
nuclear industry and its supporters that favoured giving loan guarantees for nuclear 
development and recommended that the government carry out such demands (Energy and 
Climate Change Committee 2013). Loan guarantees were also considered in other cases, 
including a proposal to turn half of the large Drax B coal fired power station into a biomass 
plant (HM Treasury 2014).  
Hence a fifth ‘hierarchical’ aspect of EMR was that in constructing and implementing 
legislation to advance the broad goal of secure low carbon energy, the choices of which 
schemes were awarded ‘investment instrument’ contracts were thus liable to influence by 
lobbies pressuring ministers and civil servants. This could even include non-energy 
considerations. For example, the Scottish Beatrice offshore wind-farm was awarded a 
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contract in the run-up to the referendum on Scottish independence following complaints 
over the lack of offshore wind contracts awarded to schemes in Scotland (Shankelman 
2014). In addition, even when it came to auctioning renewable energy contracts, the first 
tranche of which were awarded in February 2015 (DECC 2015), the volumes of contracts 
issued to different technologies was decided partly by administrative means, because 
otherwise more contracts would have been awarded to the cheapest technologies, mainly 
onshore wind.  
A sixth hierarchical aspect of EMR was the series of negotiations that the Government had 
to conduct on a supranational basis. This included in particular an application for ‘state aid’ 
to the EU for the Hinkley C development. The European Commission examined the 
agreement due to concerns that the deal represented illegal state aid and gave its consent 
in November 2014 (European Commission 2014). The construction of Hinkley C has 
continued to prove elusive, and no contract had actually been signed between EDF and the 
Government. This is associated with continued problems with the design and construction 
of the EPR in France and Finland, and an apparent reluctance of Chinese investors to 
commit to the deal due to uncertainties regarding costs (Critchlow 2015). 
Throughout the process, the British government has displayed an attachment to 
‘individualistic’ worldviews and tried to portray hierarchical interventions in terms of market 
mechanisms. Arguably, there was insufficient ‘hierarchy’ in EMR needed to ensure 
investment in the Hinkley C project, and that the necessary state support was to be 
provided by (French and Chinese) state-owned companies who could better absorb the risk 
associated with nuclear construction compared to private companies. However, even this 
proved problematic. 
A seventh example of the state’s new hierarchical actions comes with the inception of the 
‘capacity mechanism’, a device seen as especially important in light of growing fears that 
there would be insufficient electricity generating capacity to ‘keep the lights on’. Although 
The Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) took responsibility for decisions 
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regarding how much capacity would be required and when it would be required (Davey 
2014), many regard the impact of the capacity mechanism (so far) as being marginal and of 
questionable utility (Hope 2014). 
 
Conclusion 
This article contributes to the literature on regulation of public goods by showing that design 
of regulation results from tensions between different ideational inclinations. Cultural theory 
was used to explain how the programme of EMR represented a shift in the governance of 
the British electricity system from an individualistic, market orientation to one that is more 
hierarchical in nature and permits greater state intervention. Overall, EMR involved a 
number of changes to involve more governmental influence over technology outcomes. 
Egalitarian bias is implicit in the drive for decarbonisation. The egalitarian pressure for 
renewable energy from environmentalist groups has been strong. Despite being supported, 
perhaps most strongly by authorities such as the CCC, as a means of also reducing carbon 
emissions, nuclear power is perhaps more firmly driven in political terms by the emphasis 
on energy security, since this connects up with establishment priorities and a ‘hierarchical’ 
conservative desire for order. Nuclear power also requires hierarchical cultural bias for its 
implementation, something that is difficult to implement in Britain’s liberalised energy 
markets. There is a conflict with the ‘individualistic’ bias that is inherent to the design of 
Britain’s electricity system, and which is still ensconced in EMR design.  
In the electricity market the government does not determine the price, it merely offers a 
guaranteed premium for low carbon technologies, and there is no direction to invest in 
specific projects or even technologies. There are merely incentives. This set-up is very 
distinct from the old arrangements under the nationalised electricity system. It is also 
different from the centralised decision-making desired by some supporters of nuclear 
power. There are fewer conflicts between successful deployment of renewable energy and 
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the dominant market ethos of the electricity system. In this case, it seems that egalitarian 
bias is less inimical to individualistic bias, at least in part due to the fact that while 
renewable energy does need incentives and rule-changes, it does not require such 
hierarchical means of regulation to effect its implementation.  
As the arrow of policy has pointed towards seeing electricity as the provision of ‘public 
goods’ and not merely as the production of a tradable commodity at the cheapest short 
term consumer price, there has been a retreat from the ‘minimalist’ ‘market efficiency’ 
based regulation. Under EMR there has been a marked increase in government 
involvement in decisions about technology, pricing and even some specific projects. The 
framing of this shift from ‘individualistic’ to hierarchical management of the electricity 
industry helps us to categorise and define the changes. It also helps understand the limits 
to this process.  EMR  does not begin to approach a return to the conditions of a 
nationalised industry whereas state-owned corporation made investment decisions at the 
behest of politicians.   
The individualistic cultural bias that continues to underpin the electricity system has 
provided a barrier to a revived nuclear power programme. Identifying new patterns of 
governance as hierarchical and/or egalitarian leads us to understand that policy aims such 
as energy security and decarbonisation are in fact public goods and as analogous to health, 
education and welfare policies; in that they are defined by ‘hierarchical’ and ‘egalitarian’ 
political and administrative means.  
These public goods are defined and constructed through political lobbying and intra-
governmental discussions about allocations of resources. Moreover the costs of providing 
these public goods may be uncertain. Different balances of cultural bias in administrative 
organisation will be required to achieve different types of technological and public goods 
outcomes. This is particularly pronounced in a field such as electricity where the structure 
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of regulation has a dramatic effect on technological choice.  In the instance of EMR, the 
government has only been partly dragged away from its ‘individualistic’ prejudices. 
 
In particular, the delivery of public goods may be problematic when attempts are made to 
deploy hierarchical means to fit in with competitive individualism.  This is clearly 
demonstrated in this case where nuclear power depends on hierarchical arrangements to 
be successfully delivered. It may be that the trend of cultural bias towards individualism  
means that renewable energy, which may be more able to fit in with such bias, is given a 
relative advantage in the competition to take advantage of incentives to favour low carbon 
technologies. Egalitarian objectives can be reconciled, at least sometimes, with 
individualism. 
 
‘Hierarchical’ and ‘individualistic’ cultural biases can (simultaneously) dominate different 
policy areas of government e.g. policing (hierarchy) and, say, financial markets 
(individualism), but trying to combine hierarchy with individualism in the same policy zone is 
more problematic.  Policymakers must fit the cultural framing to suit their preferred (public 
good) outcomes rather than expect a defined public good to emerge from a preferred mix of 
cultural bias.   
 
Figure 1 Different types of cultural bias in social organisation 
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